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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The California Supreme Court followed 
uniform federal and state law in holding that 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“Section 230”) bars injunctive 
relief, along with other forms of liability, against 
Internet publishers of third-party speech.  The court 
rejected Petitioners’ procedural maneuvering—their 
attempt to obtain injunctive relief against Yelp Inc. 
without naming Yelp as a party in litigation or giving 
Yelp notice—finding that Section 230’s plain 
language prohibits Petitioners from obtaining any 
relief against Yelp based on its publication of third-
party content on its website, Yelp.com.  In doing so, 
the court found support in Congress’s 2018 
amendments to Section 230, which created a narrow 
exception in a single, discrete area (not relevant here), 
but otherwise reaffirmed its broad reach. 
The question presented by the Petition is: 
Should this Court accept review to hold, 
for the first time by any court in the 
Nation, that Section 230(c)(1) does not 
preclude claims for injunctive relief, 
thereby creating a clear path for 
plaintiffs to circumvent Section 230 and 
subvert the broad immunity intended by 
Congress? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The California Supreme Court followed 
uniform federal and state law in holding that Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, bars injunctive relief against Internet 
publishers such as Yelp Inc., which publishes the 
popular consumer review website Yelp.com, for their 
role in publishing third-party speech.  Its decision 
flowed from the plain language of Section 230 
mandating broad protection for Internet publishers; 
the more than 300 cases that consistently have 
applied that plain language to prevent plaintiffs from 
obtaining any form of relief (including at least nine 
cases explicitly holding that Section 230 bars 
injunctive relief); and Congress’s repeated 
affirmation that federal and state courts correctly 
have discerned Congress’s intent by broadly 
interpreting the statute.  Congress’s amendment of 
Section 230 this last summer—to narrow the statute 
in a single respect, but otherwise leave its broad 
protection intact—is the most recent example of this 
clear congressional intent. 
In the face of this overwhelming weight of 
authority, Petitioners’ nationwide search has 
revealed only two cases that they can even argue are 
contrary to the California Supreme Court’s decision.  
Pet. 16-17.  Neither is.  The single district court 
decision Petitioners cite was issued twenty years ago 
and merely stated in dicta, without any analysis, that 
a different subsection of Section 230 (not at issue 
here) did not bar injunctive relief.  That case offers 
only an exceedingly slender reed on which to rest 
Petitioners’ claims.  The only circuit court decision 
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Petitioners cite addresses the collateral order 
doctrine, and simply holds that orders denying relief 
under Section 230 are not immediately appealable.  It 
says nothing about Section 230’s applicability to 
claims for injunctive relief and provides no reed at all 
on which to rest Petitioners’ claims.  Neither decision 
conflicts with the California court’s decision. 
As Petitioners’ inability to cite a single case 
supporting their Petition demonstrates, there is no 
conflict whatsoever among the circuits.  The cases 
they cite are irrelevant and do not address the 
question they pose—whether Section 230(c)(1) bars 
injunctive relief targeting online publishers of third-
party speech (as opposed to the original speakers 
themselves, who receive no protection from Section 
230).  Given this, if this Court has any reason to 
resolve the question presented, that resolution should 
await further development in the lower courts.  
Certiorari should be denied. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Factual Background.  
Yelp allows any member of the public to read 
and write online reviews about local businesses, 
government services, and other entities.  A00240.  
Yelp is available to the public at no charge and 
without any registration requirement.  Id.  Those who 
register by creating an account may write reviews 
about businesses and service providers, and thus 
contribute to a growing body of tens of millions of 
publicly-available consumer reviews.  Id.  Tens of 
millions of other users read the reviews on Yelp when 
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making a wide range of consumer and other decisions.  
Id.  The businesses listed on Yelp also can create free 
accounts, which allow them to publicly respond to any 
review, with such a response appearing next to the 
original review.  Id.  Individuals posting reviews on 
Yelp can remove them at any time.  A00841.  As Yelp’s 
website explains, it applies automated software to all 
reviews posted in an attempt to provide the most 
helpful reviews to consumers.  A00519. 
Hassell, a San Francisco attorney, owns The 
Hassell Law Group, P.C. (collectively, “Petitioners”).  
A00006.  According to Petitioners’ Complaint, 
Defendant Bird suffered a personal injury on June 16, 
2012, and retained The Hassell Law Group.  A00002-
3.  After a few months, Petitioners ended the 
attorney-client relationship.  Id.  On January 28, 2013 
a user with the screen name “Birdzeye B.” posted a 
one-star review of The Hassell Law Group on Yelp, 
complaining that “dawn hassell made a bad situation 
much worse for me” and accusing Petitioners of failing 
to communicate with her and abandoning her as a 
client, among other things.  A00018.  Believing that 
“Birdzeye B.” was Bird, Petitioners sent Bird an email 
that day, requesting she remove the “factual 
inaccuracies and defamatory remarks” from Yelp.  
A00005.  Bird replied the next day, complaining about 
Petitioners’ representation.  A00348.   
B. Procedural History. 
1. On April 10, 2013, Dawn Hassell 
individually, and the Hassell Law Group P.C., filed a 
complaint against Bird, but not Yelp, in San 
Francisco Superior Court.  A00002.  The suit asserted 
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claims based on two allegedly defamatory reviews—
one by Birdzeye B. and another by a reviewer 
identified as J.D. (A00004-5)—and sought 
compensatory and punitive damages.  It also sought 
injunctive relief against Bird only.  A00013.  Although 
the Birdzeye B. public account profile stated that its 
creator lived in Los Angeles (A00091), Bird was 
served through substitute service on the owner of the 
Oakland home in which Bird was injured, who told 
the process server that he had not seen Bird in 
months.  A00026.  On July 11, 2013, the court entered 
a default against Bird.  A00023.1 
On November 1, 2013, Petitioners filed a 
Summary of the Case in Support of Default Judgment 
and Request for Injunctive Relief.  A00033-36.  They 
significantly expanded the relief being sought as 
described in the Complaint, adding another allegedly 
defamatory statement to their claim (A00036, 
A00102) and demanding for the first time that the 
court 
make an order compelling Defendant 
and Yelp to remove the defamatory 
                                            
1 Many of the factual assertions in the Petition for 
Review are untrue or exaggerated.  Pet. 2.  For example, Bird 
did not post “a series of negative reviews” before being sued.  Id.  
She posted one review before the complaint was filed and 
Petitioners claimed without any evidence that Bird also had 
posted a review under a different user name.  Pet. 57a-60a, 64a.  
Bird posted another review as an update after Petitioners sued 
her.  Pet. 60a-61a.  Petitioners also ignore the flawed service of 
process and the fact that they made no effort to enforce the 
judgment directly against Bird, and therefore have no idea if 
enforcement remedies available to them under California law 
would have been effective.  Pet. 60a, 98a. 
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statements, including all entire posts, 
immediately. If for any reason 
Defendant does not remove them all by 
the Court-ordered deadline (which is 
likely given Defendant’s refusal to 
answer the complaint), the Court should 
order Yelp.com to remove all 3 of them. 
A00051 (emphasis in original). 
Petitioners’ Request for Judgment went 
further, seeking “an Order ordering Yelp.com to 
remove the reviews and subsequent comments of the 
reviewer within 7 business days of the date of the 
court’s Order.”  A00051 (emphasis added).  For 
several months, Petitioners did not serve their 
application for default judgment on Yelp or otherwise 
notify Yelp about it.  A00243; see also A00837.  The 
court granted the requested injunction, including the 
part ordering non-party Yelp to remove the existing 
comments and any “subsequent” comments posted by 
“Birdzeye B.” or “J.D.”  A00213.  The court made no 
factual findings as to Yelp.  Id. 
After an exchange of correspondence between 
Petitioners and Yelp in which Yelp explained, among 
other things, that Section 230(c)(1) and (e)(3) barred 
Plaintiff’s attempts to enforce the injunction against 
it (A00537-551), on May 23, 2014, Yelp moved to 
vacate the Judgment based in part on the “expansive 
immunity” provided by Section 230 (A00235; see 
A00225-470), which Petitioners opposed (A00471-
572).  On September 29, 2014, the trial court denied 
Yelp’s Motion.  A00808.  It held that injunctions may 
run to non-parties who are aiding and abetting an 
6 
enjoined person to violate an injunction and 
concluded that Yelp fit within this narrow exception 
to general due process requirements.  A00808-809.  It 
implicitly rejected Yelp’s claim to immunity under 
Section 230, not even referencing it in its order.  Id.    
2. In a published decision, the court of 
appeal affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Yelp 
was bound by the prior restraint.  Pet. 6a.  Among 
other things, the court of appeal held that Section 230 
did not protect Yelp from Petitioners’ injunction.  Pet. 
39a-51a.  Its decision turned largely on the fact that 
Petitioners tactically chose not to sue Yelp, or even 
give it advance notice of their claims, which the court 
found “distinguish[ed] the present case from Yelp’s 
authority, all cases in which causes of action or 
lawsuits against internet service providers were 
dismissed pursuant to section 230.”  Pet. 47a 
(citations omitted); see also id. 49a-51a.  The court 
reasoned that “[i]f an injunction is itself a form of 
liability, that liability was imposed on Bird, not Yelp.”  
Id. 50a-51a.  The court rejected each of Yelp’s 
arguments.  Id. 48a-51a. 
3. The California Supreme Court granted 
Yelp’s Petition for Review and reversed the decisions 
of the trial court and court of appeal.  As relevant 
here, that court recognized the broad reach of Section 
230, explaining that “[t]he immunity provisions 
within section 230 ‘have been widely and consistently 
interpreted to confer broad immunity against 
defamation liability for those who use the Internet to 
publish information that originated from another 
source.’”  Pet. 73a (citations omitted); see generally 
Pet. 73a-82a (discussing cases).  The court then 
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turned to the language of the statute to glean the 
legislative intent.  Pet. 82a. 
The court found that Section 230 plainly 
applied to Petitioners’ claims, and “[h]ad plaintiffs’ 
claims for defamation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and false light been alleged 
directly against Yelp, these theories would be readily 
understood as treating Yelp as the ‘publisher or 
speaker’ of the challenged reviews” within the scope 
of Section 230.  Pet. 83a (citations omitted).  The court 
explained that “[t]his immunity, moreover, would 
have shielded Yelp from the injunctive relief that 
plaintiffs seek.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Petitioners do 
not dispute this reasoning, or the court’s holdings on 
these points. 
The California Supreme Court then enunciated 
the question at the heart of this case—“whether a 
different result should obtain because plaintiffs made 
the tactical decision not to name Yelp as a defendant.”  
Pet. 84a.  In other words, does a plaintiff’s “litigation 
strategy allow[] them to accomplish indirectly what 
Congress has clearly forbidden them to achieve 
directly”?  Id.  The court answered with a resounding 
“no.”  Regardless of the procedural posture, by 
entering injunctive relief against Yelp, the lower 
courts were treating Yelp “as ‘the publisher or 
speaker of ... information provided by another 
information content provider,’” which Section 230 
prohibited.  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).)  Pet. 84a 
(citations omitted).  
Noting that “‘courts have rebuffed attempts to 
avoid section 230 through the “creative pleading” of 
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barred claims,’” the court explained that “we are not 
persuaded by plaintiffs’ description of the situation 
before the court.”  Id. (citing Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 
F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016)).  The court recognized 
that California law has held non-parties to be bound 
by injunctions in limited circumstances, but held that 
this principle does not supplant the 
inquiry that section 230(c)(1) requires. 
Parties and nonparties alike may have 
the responsibility to comply with court 
orders, including injunctions. But an 
order that treats an Internet 
intermediary ‘as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider’ 
nevertheless falls within the parameters 
of section 230(c)(1). 
Pet. 86a (citation omitted).  Because, at bottom, “Yelp 
is being held to account for nothing more than its 
ongoing decision to publish the challenged reviews” 
(Pet. 87a), the court found that Section 230 plainly 
applies.2  
The court rejected Petitioners’ narrow 
definition of the “liability” barred by Section 230—
effectively, civil liability for damages—explaining 
that “[t]his argument reads constraining force into 
the language within section 230(e)(3)” that does not 
                                            
2 In doing so, the court asserted that Yelp was 
“immunized from suit.”  Id.  The Petition seizes on this language 
to claim a circuit split.  E.g., Pet. 16-17.  As explained below, 
Petitioners play with words, confusing two very different kinds 
of immunity.  Section III.B, infra. 
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exist.  As the court explained, “[t]his phrasing does 
not provide strong support for, much less compel, 
plaintiffs’ construction,” and “in common legal 
parlance at the time of section 230’s enactment, 
‘liability’ could encompass more than merely the 
imposition of damages.”  Pet. 90a (citing Black’s Law 
Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 914).  Thus, “plaintiffs’ 
interpretation misses the forest for the trees.  Section 
230(e)(3) underscores, rather than undermines, the 
broad scope of section 230 immunity by prohibiting 
not only the imposition of ‘liability’ under certain 
state-law theories, but also the pursuit of a proscribed 
‘cause of action.’”  Pet. 91a (citations omitted).   
The court concluded that Section 230’s 
“inclusive language … conveys an intent to shield 
Internet intermediaries from the burdens associated 
with defending against state-law claims that treat 
them as the publisher or speaker of third party 
content” and demands that treat them as a publisher, 
which Congress believed “would facilitate the ongoing 
development of the Internet.”  Pet. 91a-92a (citations 
omitted).  Because “[t]hese interests are squarely 
implicated in this case”—“[a]n injunction like the 
removal order plaintiffs obtained can impose 
substantial burdens on an Internet intermediary”—
the court held that Section 230 prevented application 
of the injunction to Yelp.  Pet. 92a. 
Finally, the court noted the strong public policy 
reasons supporting its decision.  Recognizing “that 
plaintiffs’ position, if accepted, would open the door to 
fraud and to sharp litigating tactics,” the court 
explained that “[t]here are numerous reasons why a 
removal order that appears facially valid may 
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nevertheless be challenged by an Internet 
intermediary as illegitimate.”  Pet. 93a n.24.  Noting 
the skewed incentives that would result from the 
dissent’s approach—which would have granted courts 
free reign to issue injunctions against Internet 
intermediaries without any advance notice—the court 
explained the practical implications of permitting 
such an easy workaround to Section 230 liability.  Pet. 
93a-94a & n.25.  It elaborated: 
As evinced by the injunction sought in 
[Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. 
App. 4th 684 (2001)], which demanded 
nothing less than control over what local 
library patrons could view on the 
Internet (id., at p. 691 …), the extension 
of injunctions to these otherwise 
immunized nonparties would be 
particularly conducive to stifling, 
skewing, or otherwise manipulating 
online discourse—and in ways that go 
far beyond the deletion of libelous 
material from the Internet.  Congress did 
not intend this result, any more than it 
intended that Internet intermediaries be 
bankrupted by damages imposed 
through lawsuits attacking what are, at 
their core, only decisions regarding the 
publication of third party content. 
Pet. 96a-97a.  Pointing out that Petitioners “still have 
powerful, if uninvoked, remedies available to them” 
against Bird, the court rejected Petitioners’ 
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arguments and reversed the decisions of the lower 
courts.  Pet. 98a-99a.3 
III. REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
A. Uniform Federal and State Law 
Supports the California Supreme 
Court’s Decision. 
The Internet has effected one of the greatest 
expansions of free speech and communications in 
history.  As this Court put it, “the content on the 
Internet is as diverse as human thought.”  Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 852 
(1997) (citation omitted). 
This is no accident.  In 1996, to promote the 
free flow of information on the Internet, Congress 
resolved to protect websites and other online 
providers from liability for their users’ content.  
Section 230 embodies that command, prohibiting 
courts from treating such a provider as the “publisher 
or speaker” of third-party content.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1).  Grounded in core First Amendment 
principles, Section 230 offers extraordinary protection 
for innovation and expansion of free speech on the 
Internet.   
                                            
3 The court’s analysis of Section 230 commanded the 
concurrence of a majority of the court.  Three Justices fully 
joined the lead opinion (Pet. 99a); a fourth Justice agreed that 
Section 230 bars Petitioners’ attempt to enjoin Yelp’s speech but 
wrote separately to argue that the case should have been decided 
on another ground (Pet. 100a). 
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1. Federal and State Courts 
Consistently Hold that Section 
230 Broadly Protects Internet 
Publishers. 
Section 230 was adopted to “preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” 
and to “encourage the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information is 
received by individuals, families, and schools who use 
the Internet.”  47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(2), (3).  Congress’s 
goals were achieved.  The Internet has become an 
indispensable open forum for third-party speech, as 
this Court recently affirmed in Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-36 (2017). 
a. To achieve these and other goals, 
Congress barred any claims against Internet 
publishers based on the publication of third-party 
content—i.e., content not created by the website 
operator itself, but contributed by an array of authors, 
photographers, and others that provide a diversity of 
expression that extends far beyond the resources of 
any one single online publisher.  Section 230 sets forth 
a straightforward principle:  If someone authors 
injurious content, a plaintiff can pursue the author of 
that content, but not the entity that displays it on the 
Internet.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see generally 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Carafano”) (protecting website 
where “the selection of the content was left 
exclusively to the user”).   
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As the California Supreme Court previously 
explained—and courts consistently have held—
Section 230 “precludes courts from entertaining 
claims that would place a computer service provider 
in a publisher’s role.  Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a 
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
content—are barred.”  Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 
4th 33, 43-44 (2006) (citing Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Zeran”)).  The 
court invoked “the congressional finding that the 
Internet has flourished ‘with a minimum of 
government regulation’ (§ 230(a)(4)), and the policy 
statement favoring a free market for interactive 
computer services ‘unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation’ (§ 230(b)(2))” to support its decision 
rejecting liability there.  Id. at 44 (citing Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330-331; emphasis added).  The court 
reiterated that “Congress ‘made a policy choice ... not 
to deter harmful online speech [by] imposing tort 
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.’”  Id. 
b. To accomplish its broad goals, Section 
230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider,” and it 
separately preempts any state law, including 
imposition of tort liability, that is inconsistent with 
its protections.  47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1) & (e)(3).  Courts 
reviewing Section 230’s legislative history have found 
that it has two primary goals.   
14 
First, “Section 230 was enacted, in part, to 
maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum.”  Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 331.   
Second, Congress designed Section 230 to 
“encourage service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their 
services….  In line with this purpose, § 230 forbids the 
imposition of publisher liability on a service provider 
for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory 
functions.”  Id. (emphasis added); accord Carafano, 
339 F.3d at 1122-23; Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 
1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Batzel”). 
To further these two complimentary policy 
goals, “courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite 
robust,” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123, and federal 
courts consistently have rejected attempts to hold 
defendants responsible for third-party content posted 
on their websites.4  In each of these decisions, the 
                                            
4 See, e.g., Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 
(1st Cir. 2016); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 
F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 
456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); Green v. America Online, 
Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 470-72 (3d Cir. 2003); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-
32; Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); Jones 
v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, 
Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008); Johnson 
v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Carafano, 339 F.3d 
at 1125; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031-32; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. 
v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-86 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“Ben Ezra”); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 
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appellate court properly focused on the author of the 
content—rather than the publisher or distributor—no 
matter how offensive or objectionable the content 
might be.  This is because “Congress made a policy 
choice … not to deter harmful online speech through 
the separate route of imposing tort liability on 
companies that serve as intermediaries for other 
parties’ potentially injurious messages.”  Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 330; see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.Com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254-255 
(4th Cir. 2009) (Section 230 “immunity protects 
websites not only from ultimate liability, but also 
from having to fight costly and protracted legal 
battles” (citations, internal quotes omitted)); accord 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.   
2. Federal and State Courts 
Consistently Hold that Section 
230(c)(1) Prevents Injunctive 
Relief. 
As the California court correctly concluded, 
Petitioner’s arguments turn on an exceedingly narrow 
definition of the “liability” that is precluded by Section 
230.  Pet. 90a.  That court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
arguments, explaining that “in common legal 
parlance at the time of Section 230’s enactment, 
‘liability’ could encompass more than merely the 
imposition of damages.”  Id. (citing Liability, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); “defining ‘liability’ as 
“a broad legal term that has been referred to as of the 
most comprehensive significance, including almost 
                                            
(11th Cir. 2006); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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every character of hazard or responsibility, absolute, 
contingent or likely”).  See also Pet. 90a-91a nt. 23 
(explaining inconsistencies in dissenting Justice’s 
narrow interpretation of “liability”).  Indeed, 
injunctive relief “is typically more intrusive” than 
damage awards, Noah v. AOL Time Warner, 261 F. 
Supp. 2d 532, 540 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d 2004 WL 
602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004), and this Court long 
has recognized the uniquely pernicious dangers of 
prior restraints on speech.  See, e.g., Nebraska Press 
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).  The 
suggestion that prior restraints are allowed where 
liability is barred would turn the First Amendment on 
its head.  
Given this, it is no surprise that courts across 
the nation consistently have held that Section 230 
bars injunctive relief, as well as tort and contract 
liability.  See Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983, 986 (Section 
230 barred claims for damages and injunctive relief); 
Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 
687, 692 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (claims seeking injunctive 
relief and damages based on allegedly selling recalled 
hunting equipment barred by Section 230); Dart v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963, 969 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (rejecting public nuisance claim, including 
request for injunctive relief); Smith v. Intercosmos 
Media Group, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, 2002 WL 
31844907, *13-14 (E.D. La. 2002) (rejecting injunction 
claim against ISP based on alleged failure to block 
purportedly fictitious domain registrants); Giordano 
v. Romeo, 76 So.3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011) (rejecting claims for defamation and injunctive 
relief); Shiamili v. Real Estate Group, 17 N.Y.3d 281, 
285, 293 (2011) (rejecting defamation claim based on 
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a blog post, seeking damages and injunctive relief); 
Reit v. Yelp!, 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (N.Y. Supr. 2010) 
(rejecting request for preliminary injunction, and 
granting Yelp’s motion to dismiss complaint). 
The reason federal and state courts 
consistently conclude that Section 230 bars injunctive 
relief is clear.  “An action to force a website to remove 
content on the sole basis that the content is 
defamatory is necessarily treating the website as a 
publisher, and is therefore inconsistent with section 
230.”  Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, 
Inc., 152 So.3d 727, 729, 730-731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (rejecting action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief based on Section 230).  
Thus, in Kathleen R., 87 Cal. App. 4th at 697-
698, the court of appeal held that section 230(c)(1) 
protected a city from claims based on public access to 
the Internet at a public library, which included a 
request for injunctive relief.  The court explained that 
“by its plain language, § 230[(c)(1)] creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.”  Id. at 692, 697-
698 (citation, internal quotes omitted; bracketed 
citation in original).  Noting that “claims for … 
injunctive relief are no less causes of action than tort 
claims for damages,” the court held that they also “fall 
squarely within the section 230(e)(3) prohibition.”  Id. 
at 698.  As such, the plaintiff’s equitable claims there 
“contravene[d] section 230’s stated purpose of 
promoting unfettered development of the Internet no 
less than her damage claims.”  Id. 
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As the court explained in Noah, 261 F. Supp. 
2d at 538-39, 
given that the purpose of § 230 is to 
shield service providers from legal 
responsibility for the statements of third 
parties, § 230 should not be read to 
permit claims that request only 
injunctive relief.  After all, in some 
circumstances injunctive relief will be at 
least as burdensome to the service 
provider as damages, and is typically 
more intrusive. 
Id. at 540; see id. at 538-39 (in seeking to hold 
defendant liable for refusing to intervene to stop 
alleged online harassment and requesting “an 
injunction requiring [defendant] to adopt ‘affirmative 
measures’ to stop such harassment,” plaintiff 
“clearly” is attempting “to ‘place’ [defendant] ‘in a 
publisher’s role,’ in violation of § 230” (citing Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330)).  
Petitioners cannot cite a single case that 
supports their claim that Section 230 allows 
interactive computer services to be subject to 
injunctions to remove third-party content so long as 
they are not named in an action.  See Section B, infra.  
The California Supreme Court plainly was correct in 
rejecting Petitioners’ demand for injunctive relief 
against Yelp because it is entirely based on 
Petitioners’ claim that Yelp published defamatory 
speech, but Section 230 bars all such claims.  Pet. 92a-
93a.  The lower court’s decision is consistent with 
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uniform federal and state law.  The Petition presents 
no issue worthy of this Court’s review. 
B. There Is No Circuit Split On this Issue. 
Petitioners found only two cases—in the entire 
Nation—that they could cite to claim a circuit split.  
Pet. 16-17.  But no circuit court decision addresses the 
point raised in the Petition for Certiorari—thus, there 
is no circuit split—and neither case Petitioners cite 
even supports their request for this Court’s review.  
Instead, the district court decision they invoke merely 
mentions a different Section 230 subsection in dicta, 
and the circuit case addresses the collateral order 
doctrine, not whether Section 230(c)(1) applies to 
injunctive relief. 
1. Petitioners rely primarily on a case 
decided two decades ago—and barely cited since—
holding that a plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief 
was not barred by Section 230(c)(2)—a subsection not 
at issue in this case.  Pet. 16 (citing Mainstream 
Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 
2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998)).  The court held that Section 
230(c)(2) does not protect government entities—there, 
a public library sued for its attempt to block access to 
certain content at public terminals—because 
Congress’ intent was to protect private content 
providers.  Id. at 787, 790.  In dicta, the court said that 
even if it did, “defendants cite no authority to suggest 
that the ‘tort-based’ immunity to ‘civil liability’ 
described by § 230 would bar the instant action, which 
is for declaratory and injunctive relief.”  Id. (citing 
§ 230(a)(2); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330).  As the court in 
Kathleen R. later pointed out—and Petitioners fail to 
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acknowledge—Mainstream Loudoun is 
distinguishable because subsection (c)(2) contains 
limiting language that is not applicable to subsection 
230(c)(1).  87 Cal. App. 4th at 697-698.  Thus, even if 
this conclusory, twenty-year-old dicta were worthy of 
this Court’s attention—it is not—it would not matter 
because the district court interpreted a different 
subsection of Section 230. 
2. The second case Petitioners invoke is 
even less relevant.  Pet. 17, citing General Steel 
Domestic Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178 
(10th Cir. 2016).  There, the district court rejected 
defendant’s request for summary judgment of claims 
against it based on twenty allegedly misleading 
Internet posts, finding that only three were barred by 
Section 230.  Id. at 1180.  Defendant appealed, and 
the sole issue decided by the Tenth Circuit was 
whether the collateral order doctrine conferred 
appellate jurisdiction on the court.  Id. at 1180-81.  
The court relied on this Court’s “‘increasingly 
emphatic instructions that the class of cases capable 
of satisfying this “stringent” test should be 
understood as “small,” “modest,” and “narrow”’” to 
hold that it did not.  Id. at 1181 (citation omitted).   
The court rejected defendant’s argument that 
prior references to Section 230 as providing 
“immunity from suit” supported immediate review, 
explaining that such immunity would require “‘an 
explicit statutory or constitutional guarantee that 
trial will not occur’” but Section 230 “does not contain 
such language.”  Id. at 1181-82 & n.1 (citation 
omitted).  The court explained that the qualified 
immunity that supports appellate jurisdiction 
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allowing immediate review “is a benefit typically only 
reserved for government officials.”  Id. at 1182 
(citations omitted; discussing “three instances when 
courts may extend qualified immunity to private 
parties,” none of which applied there). 
Contrary to Petitioners’ claims, General Steel 
is in no way inconsistent with the California Supreme 
Court’s Opinion.  Pet. 17.  That court did not consider 
the type or scope of liability barred by Section 230.  It 
merely addressed the separate question of 
jurisdiction for immediate appellate review under 
federal law.  Petitioners’ heavy reliance on this case—
although it is wholly inapposite—exposes the 
emptiness of their request to this Court.  If this 
Court’s review of this issue ever might be warranted, 
it would only be after a more fulsome analysis by the 
lower appellate courts.  There is no genuine conflict 
among the lower courts and even if there were, this is 
not a suitable case to resolve that conflict. 
C. Congress Has Consistently Approved 
Section 230’s Broad Reach, with 
Narrow Exceptions as It Deems 
Appropriate. 
Petitioners tellingly ignore Congress’s 
consistent approval of the broad reach of Section 230 
that courts have recognized—presumably because it 
refutes the arguments at the heart of their Petition.  
In both of its decisions interpreting Section 230, the 
California Supreme Court has noted and adhered to 
this plain evidence of legislative intent, establishing 
that its interpretations of Section 230 have been 
correct. 
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1. In its first decision interpreting Section 
230, the California Supreme Court pointed out that in 
2002—as Section 230 was in its infancy, and its full 
reach being explored by the courts—Congress 
adopted legislation that created a new Internet 
domain for family-friendly content.  Barrett, 40 Cal. 
4th at 54.  Citing to a Congressional Report prepared 
by one of the co-authors of Section 230, the court 
noted Congress’ express approval of the broad 
interpretation of Section 230(c) in cases such as 
Zeran, Ben Ezra and Doe v. America Online, 783 
So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001).  Id. at 54 & nts. 16, 17.   
2. In the Opinion at issue here, the 
California Supreme Court found support for its 
holding in the fact “that in another instance where 
Congress became aware of procedural end-runs 
around section 230, it took steps to rein in these 
practices—instead of regarding a judgment so 
obtained as a fait accompli that must be enforced, 
without further consideration of the circumstances 
surrounding it.”  Pet. 85a nt. 20.  The court explained 
that Congress’ enactment in 2010 of the Securing the 
Protection of Our Enduring and Established 
Constitutional Heritage Act (28 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq.), 
“responded to concerns that defamation judgments 
were being obtained in countries that did not 
recognize the same free-speech protections as those 
provided in the United States.”  Pet. 85a nt. 20 (citing 
Sen. Rep. No. 111-224, 2d Sess., at 2 (2010).)  The 
legislation prohibited courts from recognizing foreign 
judgments for defamation unless doing so would be 
consistent with Section 230. Pet. 85a-86a nt. 20 
(citing id., 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1).)  Thus, Congress 
again expressed its approval of the broad reach of 
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Section 230, without any suggestion that Section 230 
should be constrained in any way. 
3. Finally, as the court recognized, the 
President recently signed into law the “Allow States 
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 
2017” (“SESTA/FOSTA”).  Pet. 97a (citing Pub. L. No. 
115-164, § 4 (April 11, 2018) 132 Stat. 1253).  With 
this narrow bill, Congress amended Section 230 and 
relevant criminal statutes to withdraw Section 230 
immunity from certain state criminal actions against 
persons involved in sex trafficking.  As the court 
explained, “[f]or almost two decades, courts have been 
relying on section 230 to deny plaintiffs injunctive 
relief when their claims inherently treat an Internet 
intermediary as a publisher or speaker of third party 
conduct.”  Pet. 97a; see also Section A.2, supra.  
Although some plaintiffs undoubtedly were harmed 
by the speech at issue, “Congress has declined to 
amend section 230 to authorize injunctive relief 
against mere republishers, even as it has limited 
immunity in other ways.”  Pet. 97a (citing Pub. L. No. 
115-164, § 4 (April 11, 2018) 132 Stat. 1253 (emphasis 
added)).  The court concluded that “[a]lthough this 
acquiescence is not itself determinative, it provides a 
final indication that the dissenting justices are simply 
substituting their judgment for that of Congress 
regarding what amounts to good policy with regard to 
online speech.  But that is not our role.”  Pet. 97a-98a 
(emphasis added). 
4. At bottom, the Petition is premised on 
Petitioners’ claim that the Internet is an unregulated 
abyss, affording no recourse to people purportedly 
harmed by third-party speech posted there.  But this 
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is simply not true.  As shown above, Congress 
specifically addressed one of the issues repeatedly 
invoked by Petitioners—human trafficking—by 
providing that Section 230 does not stand in the way 
of enforcement of federal and state criminal laws.  
Outside of this unrelated area, plaintiffs are not left 
without a remedy—although if they were, it would not 
matter because Congress’s intent controls.   
For over twenty years, Congress has insisted 
that plaintiffs look to the content creator alone for a 
remedy, including through tools such as judgment 
liens and contempt proceedings—post-judgment 
options that Petitioners never pursued here, but 
which the California Supreme Court appropriately 
recognized could provide meaningful relief to 
Petitioners.  Pet. 98a.  In the past two decades, no 
court has approved Petitioners’ stratagem of denying 
a website publisher its due process rights in order to 
tactically avoid the immunity Congress established 
through Section 230.  This Court’s blessing of the 
injunction entered against Yelp—following an 
uncontested hearing to prove up the default judgment 
against the Internet poster alone (A00213)—would 
create a gaping hole in the broad immunity adopted 
by Congress in Section 230, that future plaintiffs 
would quickly exploit. 
As Congress appropriately has recognized, 
Section 230 immunity plays a vital role in the legal 
landscape that has allowed the Internet to flourish.  
“The provisions of section 230(c)(1), conferring broad 
immunity on Internet intermediaries, are [] a strong 
demonstration of legislative commitment to the value 
of maintaining a free market for online expression.”  
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Barrett, 40 Cal. 4th at 56.  Viewed only through the 
prism of review websites such as Yelp, Section 230’s 
broad protection of websites that publish third-party 
content plainly serves the public interest.  E.g., 
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996, 1006 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[f]urther incentivizing a quality 
consumer experience are the numerous consumer 
review websites, like Yelp ..., which provide 
consumers a forum to rate the quality of their 
experiences”).   
Congress’s studied decision to provide broad 
protections to Yelp and entities like it plainly furthers 
the public interest.  If Internet publishers are denied 
their right to exercise editorial control in publishing 
consumer reviews, businesses will have an effective 
tool to remove critical commentary and consumers 
will suffer.  If this Court were to reverse the 
California court’s opinion, Yelp and other websites 
would suffer and the public that relies on the wealth 
of online third-party commentary—to aid decision-
making on myriad issues like consumer purchases, 
politics, and employment—would be harmed as 
subjects of criticism follow Petitioners’ example:  
intentionally sue the commenter alone, perhaps in a 
manner that maximizes the chance that he or she will 
be unable or unwilling to defend the lawsuit 
regardless of its underlying merit, and then after a 
default judgment present the injunction to the 
website publisher as an unassailable fait accompli.  
Pet. 93a & nt. 24.  A decision reversing the California 
court would undermine the validity and efficacy of the 
information available to consumers, and online 
speech generally.   
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Petitioners’ quest to deny Yelp the federal 
immunity it would have received if Petitioners had 
sued Yelp directly should stop here and now.  Their 
insistence that the lower courts should have elevated 
the form of the action—namely, the fact that Yelp was 
tactically not named as a party—over the plain 
language of Section 230 and Congress’s clear intent in 
enacting it to protect websites from actions that treat 
them as publishers or distributors of third-party 
content, would exalt form over substance and 
eviscerate the protection provided by Section 230.  
Congress has spoken—repeatedly—and the 
California Supreme Court properly has abided by that 
mandate in its decisions interpreting Section 230.  
There is no Circuit split; there is no statutory 
language; and there is no public policy, to support 
Petitioners’ arguments.  Petitioners seek a remedy 
without a reason.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of 
December, 2018. 
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